In addition, as originally planned, the operationĬontemplated considerable inter-allied liaison, as the major gunfire support ships were to be largely British.Īpproximately January 1 an area about five miles deep and fronting some three miles on the sea was cleared of inhabitants and made available at Use of specially trained organic division troops the employment on a large scale of shallow draft converted landing craft to add to the fire support Īnd the use of frequency modulated voice radio (SCR 609) sets for shore fire control communications. Significant of these were the attachment to the divisions of Shore Fire Control Parties from the Joint Assault Signal Companies as opposed to the This Operation involved the use of several departures from previous practice in Naval Support Gunfire procedure. Photographic coverage and interpretation, which was excellent in this operation, is of paramount importance and should be continued.Ĭommander Assault Force "0", (Commander Eleventh Amphibious Force).īackground. Carrier based and land based groups should be especially trained in spotting naval gunfire for amphibious operations. Heavy air bombing of enemy strong points should be accomplished prior to the assault.Īircraft capable of remaining on station for at least 2 or 3 hours and capable of low altitude flying to search for targets of opportunity are Longer periods of prearranged bombardment with deliberate fire at long and close range are required to effectively reduce strong enemy coastal and This group consisted of AUGUSTA (WNTF Flagship),īELLONA, DESDIV 33, plus PLUNKETT, DESDIV 119 and DESDIV 18. To the Assault Forces of the Western Task Force was as follows: Assault Force "O"Ī reserve fire support group was constituted to relieve ships which had severe battle damage or had depleted their ammunition. warships to the Western Task Force certain British warships were detached and the final assignment of fire support ships
Late in February the following British warships were designated for allocation to the Western Task Force: RAMILLIES However, an increased air bombing effort wasĪvailable to assist 1n neutralizing both the coastal batteries and the beach defenses. By D-day the known coastalīatteries had increased in number and in strength as many batteries were placed in concrete casements.
This estimate was based upon the strength of coastal defenses and upon the scheme of maneuver of the FIRST U.S.
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